

FOSDEM 2020 The Confidential Consortium Framework

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CCF: Multi-party applications



Verifiable consortium governance



Fine-grained confidentiality



Simple programming model




High availability



High efficiency

CCF: Multi-party applications



A network of Trusted Execution Environments


Trusted Execution Environments

- Encrypted and integrity-protected memory
- · Cryptographic evidence over running code
- Remote attestation




Distributed Trusted Computation

Node Overview



- TLS terminates in Enclave
- Host untrusted
- Enclave contains:
 - Application
 Logic/State
 - Governance
 - Fault Tolerance

Host-enclave communication



Join protocol

Adding a node to a CCF network

- Node
 - Create key pair
 - Send enclave quote to network
 - Platform
 - Code
 - Identity
- Network

Governance

- Endorse identity
- Send data secrets
- Node
 - Part of network
 - Catch up on state

Programmable, verifiable Governance

Governance

- Consortium of members
 - endorse initial ledger and configuration
- Stage votes
 - Membership
 - Users
 - Network Configuration
 - Code
 - Constitution
- Voting proposal are scripts
- Votes are scripts too!

Constitution sample

```
tables, calls, votes = ...
member votes = 0
for member, vote in pairs(votes) do
 if vote then
   member votes = member votes + 1
  end
end
-- count active members
members active = 0
tables["ccf.members"]:foreach(function(member, details)
 if details["status"] == STATE ACTIVE then
   members active = members active + 1
  end
end)
```

-- check for raw puts to sensitive tables SENSITIVE TABLES = {"ccf.whitelists", "ccf.gov scripts"} for , call in pairs(calls) do if call.func == "raw puts" then for _, sensitive_table in pairs(SENSITIVE_TABLES) do if call.args[sensitive table] then -- require unanimity return member votes == members active end end end end -- a majority of members can pass votes if member votes > math.floor(members active / 2) then return true end

```
return false
```

Proposal and Vote samples



```
tables, node_id = ...
return Calls:call("new_user", user_cert)
```



tables, code_digest = ...
return Calls:call("new_code", code_digest)



Code update

- Member vote to add new supported code version
- Members vote for new configuration
 - Add new nodes
 - Retire old nodes
- Members vote to remove old code version
- Constitution rules determines vote outcome

Recovery

- On loss of > *f* nodes
- Back to original root of trust: members
 - Key shares
- New service
 - From old ledger
 - Endorsed by old ledger


Verifiability

- Governance state is public
- Governance transactions are signed
- Same total order as other transactions
- Tamper-proof ledger

A simple programming model

Data in CCF is...

- Encrypted at rest
 - In the ledger
- Encrypted in motion
 - On the wire during replication
- Encrypted during computation
 - Enclave memory is encrypted during execution



Consensus

- Deterministic commit
- Crash-fault tolerance
 - In-enclave Raft variant
 - Robust to f out of 2f + 1 failures
 - Enables blaming compromised nodes
 - Relies on TEE for confidentiality and integrity
- Byzantine fault tolerance
 - In-enclave PBFT variant, work in progress
 - Robust to f out of 3f+1 simultaneous malicious nodes
 - Relies on TEE for confidentiality

Key-value Store

- Key-Value Maps
 - get(key)
 - put(key, value)
- Transactions
 - Strict serializability
 - Opacity
- App-driven confidentiality
 - Arbitrary reveal
- Code in Store
 - Scripting runtimes

Transaction receipts

- Merkle Tree paths
- Self-verifying
- Signed by service
- Offline proof/verification

CCF Apps can be written in...

- Native
 - C++
- Runtimes with code stored in KV
 - Lua
 - EVM languages (Solidity...)
 - JavaScript/ES2015



The Confidential Consortium Framework

github.com/microsoft/CCF



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