



Trusted boot with the Genode OS Framework

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About Gapfruit

- 2012: R&D of real-world products with microkernel and capability-based security
- 2017: Roll-out military-grade notebook (HW/SW co-design)
- 2018: Founding of Gapfruit AG in Switzerland
- 2020: TEE for transactional workloads in the finance industry
- 2022: Partnership with Bechtle and Device Insight (and others) for the IIoT sector
- 2024: Funding by Innosuisse SIP



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
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Private Key Infrastructure (PKI) at Gapfruit


- Access to the cloud with Zero touch provisioning
- Protect the key that provide access to the Cloud
- Trusted Computing base record the bootchain environment in PCRs
- TPM is used to sign a short lived certificate that legacy apps use to access the cloud

TPM Stack: Design Goals


- Composability and separation of concerns
- Minimal Trusted Computing Base
- Benefit from existing libraries
- Integration of measured boot with non-brittle PCRs
- Updates with rollback prevention
- Use TPM for authentication and integration to PKI
- Compatibility with legacy POSIX applications






TPM Stack: measured boot & Platform Configuration Registers (PCR)



TPM Stack: use-case with vfs_tresor_trust_anchor




TPM stack: supported hardware




TPM Stack: TPM Driver

- **tpm-tis** VFS plugin that adapts TPM commands to SPI Bus
- Drivers:
 - CRB driver for fTPM (x86_64-hw)
 - SPI driver for dTPM (i.MX8-hw) + tpm_tis
 - lx_tpm2go driver for tpm2go (linux-linux) + tpm_tis




TPM Stack: TPM Multiplexer

- The **tpm2-tss** client expects a **/dev/tpm0** device
- The **tpm_mux** provides this file as VFS plugin
- It multiplexes commands
- It load/unload objects to **managed limited resources**
- **tpm2-abrmd** from linux world is too complex for our use-case
- **tpm_mux** a simple vfs-plugging keeping the TCB small




TPM Stack: vfs_tresor_trust_anchor

- File system plugging:
 - Generate the CBE secret key
 - Seal/Unseal the secret key on persistent FS
- Uses **tpm2-tss** that expect a **/dev/tpm0** file
- Use HMAC Session for **parameter encryption**
- Use Policy Session for PCR and passphrase **authorization**



TPM Stack: vfs_tresor_trust_anchor tpm2-tss call overview



*use parameter encryption/decryption

vfs_tresor_trust_anchor: work in progress

- No input GUI to provide the OWNER hierachy password
- No input GUI to provide the NV space auth_value, **randomly generated** value instead, therefor PCR Policy digest can not be changed
- no mechanisme to update the PCR policy digest in the NV space when the **system is updated**
- **tpm2-tss** depends on **libc**

vfs_tresor_trust_anchor challenge: tpm2-tss depends on libc

Current Mitigation

- *libc_vfs* alternativ to *vfs*
- Initialize a secondary *vfs* for *libc*, so *libc* can be used
- Wrapp calls to *tpm2-tss* with *with_libc()*

Solution

- TPM Command Transmission Interface (aka *tcti*) for *genode*
- Create minimal *libc* for *tpm2-tss* without relying on *vfs*

Lessons Learned

- TPM's are hard
- Painkillers vs. vitamins
- Using tpm2-tss and upgrading Openssl brings challenges when used in VFS
- Using a vfs plugging design organizes the complexity of trust_anchors and TPM access

Questions

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