

Trusted boot with the Genode OS Framework

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About Gapfruit

- 2012: R&D of real-world products with microkernel and capability-based security
- 2017: Roll-out military-grade notebook (HW/SW co-design)
- 2018: Founding of Gapfruit AG in Switzerland
- 2020: TEE for transactional workloads in the finance industry
- 2022: Partnership with Bechtle and Device Insight (and others) for the IIoT sector
- 2024: Funding by Innosuisse SIP





Private Key Infrastructure (PKI) at Gapfruit

- Access to the cloud with Zero touch provisioning
- Protect the key that provide access to the Cloud
- Trusted Computing base record the bootchain environment in PCRs
- TPM is used to sign a short lived certificate that legacy apps use to access the cloud




TPM Stack: Design Goals

- Composability and separation of concerns
- Minimal Trusted Computing Base
- Benefit from existing libraries
- Integration of measured boot with non-brittle PCRs
- Updates with rollback prevention
- Use TPM for authentication and integration to PKI
- Compatibility with legacy POSIX applications






TPM Stack: measured boot & Platform Configuration Registers (PCR)









TPM Stack: use-case with vfs_tresor_trust_anchor



TPM stack: supported hardware





libusb-1.0.so




TPM Stack: TPM Driver

- tpm-tis VFS plugin that adapts TPM commands to SPI Bus
- Drivers:


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- CRB driver for fTPM (x86_64-hw)
- SPI driver for dTPM (i.MX8-hw) + tpm_tis
- lx_tpm2go driver for tpm2go (linux-linux) + tpm_tis



TPM Stack: TPM Multiplexer

- The tpm2-tss client expects a /dev/tpm0 device
- The **tpm_mux** provides this file as VFS plugin
- It multiplexes commands
- It load/unload objects to managed limited resources
- tpm2-abrmd from linux world is too complex for our use-case
- tpm_mux a simple vfs-pluging keeping the TCB small





TPM Stack: vfs_tresor_trust_anchor


- File system pluging:
 - Generate the CBE secret key
 - Seal/Unseal the secret key on persistant FS
- Uses tpm2-tss that expect a /dev/tpm0 file
- Use HMAC Session for paramater encryption
- Use Policy Session for PCR and passphrase
 authorization

-O Initialize -O Hash	-0) Generate Key	-O Encrypt	Decrypt	
<pre>vfs_tresor_tr vfs: dir: name=dev fs: label=* uses: libcrypto tpm2-tss</pre>	v	nchor		
tpm_mux:vf	ଚ			

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TPM Stack: vfs_tresor_trust_anchor tpm2-tss call overview



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vfs_tresor_trust_anchor: work in progress

- No input GUI to provide the OWNER hierachy password
- No input GUI to provide the NV space auth_value, randomly generated value instead, therefor PCR Policy digest can not be changed
- no mechanisme to update the PCR policy digest in the NV space when the system is updated
- tpm2-tss depends on libc



vfs_tresor_trust_anchor challenge: tpm2-tss depends on libc

Current Mitigation

- *libc_vfs* alternativ to *vfs*
- Initialize a secondary vfs for libc, so libc can be used
- Wrapp calls to *tpm2-tss* with *with_libc()*

Solution

- TPM Command Transmission Interface (aka tcti) for genode
- Create minimal libc for tpm2-tss without relying on vfs



Lessons Learned

- TPM's are hard
- Painkillers vs. vitamins
- Using tpm2-tss and upgrading OpenssI brings challenges when used in VFS
- Using a vfs pluging design organizes the complexity of trust_anchors and TPM access



Questions

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