


# Confidential VMs on public clouds and on-premise

A long way towards zero trust

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FOSDEM2025

# What is a Confidential Virtual Machine?



Confidential VMs aim to provide data confidentiality: only the owner of the VM should be able to access or modify the data.



# CVM cloud offerings are becoming ubiquitous




- AWS
  - SEV-SNP in GA
- Azure
  - SEV-SNP in GA
  - TDX in public preview
- Google Cloud
  - SEV-SNP in GA
  - TDX in GA



# It is already possible to run CVMs on-premise

- AMD SEV-SNP
  - KVM support landed in 6.11
  - QEMU support landed in 9.1



- Intel TDX
  - Soon :-)
  - Centos [SIG](#) for 'preview'



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So we don't need to trust  
our infrastructure  
providers anymore, right?



# Why do you trust your CVM?


(AKA "attestation")



- ▶ It is a genuine CVM running on the appropriate hardware (not an emulation!)
- ▶ The initial state of the CVM is trustworthy.
- ▶ All boot chain artifacts (bootloader[s], kernel, initramfs, ...) are trustworthy.
- ▶ The storage on the VM wasn't tampered with.
- ▶ No untrusted data injected into the VM by any provisioning agents (e.g. cloud-init).




# Hardware



- ▶ Your root of trust is the CPU
- ▶ SNP/TDX can provide a signed report:
  - Can contain user-provided data, e.g. ssh host key to uniquely identify the VM you connect to and a timestamp to ensure freshness.
- ▶ CVMs using paravisors (e.g. Azure) may not give you raw access to the features and give you a pre-generated report stored in e.g. vTPM.
  - vTPM is your new root of trust.



# Initial CVM state



- ▶ Signed report contains “launch measurement” which describes (hash) the initial state of the memory and vCPUs.
- ▶ Firmware and instance specific data (e.g. ACPI tables) are supplied by the host
  - Can be pre-measured in the on-premise case (e.g. [sev-snp-measure](#))
  - Can be pre-measured if you can do a reproducible build ([AWS](#))
  - Can be pre-measured if you can bring your own firmware ([Ani's talk!](#))
  - ... or you will have to trust the opaque hash which at least doesn't change.






# Boot chain artifacts



- ▶ Launch measurements don't include binaries loaded from external storage.
- ▶ Firmware implements "vetting" (SecureBoot) or "measuring" (Measured boot) features:
  - "Vetting" is done against a varstore which may (special OVMF builds) or may not (current cloud implementations) be part of the launch measurement.
    - "Measuring" is required for the external varstore case.
- ▶ Measuring requires a TPM
  - *RTMRs can, in theory, be used on Intel TDX instead*




# Measured boot: vTPMs



- ▶ vTPM implementation must be trusted so measurements done by it are trusted.
- ▶ SEV-SNP allows for isolated in-guest implementation using VMPLs.
  - Coconut SVSM can be used on-premise.
- ▶ Different architectures offered for Intel TDX:
  - Separate TD
  - TD partitioning
- ▶ Not always clear how cloud implementations are done.
  - Microsoft's [talk](#) in the CoCo devroom!



# Storage: persistence



- ▶ Unified Kernel Images can help extend SecureBoot/MeasuredBoot protection to cover initramfs/cmdline.
  - My last year's [talk](#) at FOSDEM2024!
- ▶ Reliable SecureBoot db can be used for validating non-confidential, immutable parts of the storage (e.g. OS image)
- ▶ Volatile confidential storage requires encryption:
  - Key can be obtained through remote attestation
  - Key can be obtained from stateful vTPM



# Stateful vTPMs

- ▶ Hyperscalers offer ([AWS](#), [GCP](#), [Azure](#)) stateful vTPMs for CVMs already:
  - Only Azure [claims](#) isolation of the vTPM from the host, however, the attestation process relies on other parts on Azure infrastructure.
- ▶ For on-premise deployments, Coconut SVSM is [working](#) on a stateful vTPM solution.
  - Quite complex setup, esp. for multi-tenant environments.



# Provisioning agents



- ▶ No agent == no problem :-)
  - “Specialized” VM images with e.g. access keys pre-injected in the image are the best.
- ▶ Generalized VMs are at constant risk
  - All-or-nothing trust model in the existing agents.
  - No good way to authorize cloud datasource.
  - No good way to provide a custom datasource.



# Thank you

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