

OpenIdConnect Deep Dive

Milan Jakobi
Thales

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milan.jakobi@thalesgroup.com

+33 7 83 25 01 40



Agenda

- **Introduction**
- OAuth2/OIDC concepts
- OAuth2/OIDC flows
- Some advanced usages




Authorization: problem statement

User has 2 bank accounts in 2 different banks :

- Deutsche Bank
- BNP

He mostly uses DBs management console but wants it to also display BNP account data, so he can manage everything in one place.



▪ OAuth2


- RFC 6749, onward...
- Authorization oriented
- Based on REST APIs and JWTs:
 - Access/Refresh token,
 - Etc.

▪ OpenIDConnect

- Identity layer ontop of OAuth2
- Needed for web SSO
- Additional JWT : identity token

▪ SAML

- XML/SOAP
- Complex setup
- (Was) promoted by Microsoft
- In decline...



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OAuth2 roles

RFC 6749

■ Resource Owner

An entity/end-user capable of granting access to a protected resource

■ Authorization Server

The server issuing access tokens to the client


■ Client

An application making protected resource requests on behalf of the resource owner and with its authorization.

■ Resource Server

The server hosting the protected resources, capable of responding to protected resource requests using access tokens.

OAuth2 auth code flow diagram




OIDC : Client & Resource Server merged into Relying Party

OAuth2 : registration & validation

▪ Registration

- **Manual:** AS operator delivers `client_id` & `client_secret`
- **Dynamic:** automated registration using initial reg. code and `/register` endpoint
 - Mostly for mobiles



RFC 7951 & 7592

▪ Token validation

- **Local:** relying parties check tokens validity following OAuth2/OIDC spec (signature, expiration...)
- **Introspection:** relying parties submits tokens to AS's `/introspection` endpoint

OAuth/OIDC JSON Web Tokens

RFC 7519

■ **Access Token** ←
delivered by AS for a (short) period of time. Enables client access to resource (web page, etc.) **on behalf of end-user.**

■ **Refresh Token** ←
delivered for a longer period of time in order to renew an (expired) access token (transparently for the end-user).

■ **ID Token** ←
provides identity oriented claims (gender, age...)

■ **Userinfos** ←
non standardized token. Carries end-user attributes (gender, work site...)

OAuth2

OIDC

| Encoded | Decoded | Parts |
|--|--|-----------|
| <code>eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJpc3MiOiIiLCJpYXQiOiJlMzYyMTc5NTAsImV4cCI6MTcwNzc1Mzk1MCwiYXVkljoiYWthbWFpLWJsbn2ciLCJzdWIiOiIiLCJlb21wYW55IjojQWthbWFpIiwidXNlciI6IkFrYW1haS1yZWZkZXliLCJhZG1pbil6Im5vIn0.kMPz3Z7BSIBTJKijD8bcprzTZejX7VCZ77w5oQwJO6l</code> | <pre>{ "typ": "JWT", "alg": "HS256" }</pre> | Header |
| | <pre>{ "iss": "", "iat": 1676217950, "exp": 1707753950, "aud": "akamai-blog", "sub": "", "company": "Akamai", "user": "Akamai-reader", "admin": "no" }</pre> | Payload |
| | <pre>HMACSHA256(base64Encode(header) + "." + base64Encode(payload), secret_key)</pre> | Signature |

Claims

Scopes

- **Scopes: collection of claims in tokens**

- **Standard scopes**

- profile, email, **openid**

- **OpenID scope**

- Subject + standard claims

- **Profile scope**

- Name, family_name, given_name, middle_name, nickname, picture, updated_at + standard claims

Standard claims:


- **iss**: URL of the AS (issuer)
- **sub**: subject of the token (end-user UUID)
- **aud**: audience, client_id of the token's requester
- **exp**: expiration time of the token
- **iat**: token's time of issuance
- ...

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OAuth2: Authorization Flow




Establish trust between Relying Parties and Authorization Server

- Various ways to retrieve tokens from an Authz server
- Flows determines condition on which tokens are delivered
 - Depends on client types (Web/mobile/IoT...)

OAuth2 : Implicit Flow

Obsolete


 Token passes trough browser



```
POST https://authorization-server.com/auth?
response_type=token
&client_id=myclient
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fexmpl.com%2Fcallback
&scope=mycustomscope,openid
```

OAuth2: Authorization Code Flow


RFC 6749




```
https://authorization-server.com/auth?
response_type=code
&client_id=myclient
&client_secret=1234
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fexmpl.com%2Fcallback
&scope=mycustomscope,openid
```

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OIDC additions




In practice: web app access



Similar solutions for tomcat, springboot, js, etc.

OAuth2: authorization code interception




OAuth2: Proof of Key Exchange (PKCE)


RFC 7636

Mitigates authz code interception

code_verifier cannot be deduced from code_challenge



OAuth2: token interception



OAuth2: mTLS flow


RFC 8705



Common PKI necessary

mTLS handshake used to retrieve tokens:

- AS includes hashed client's pubkey in tokens (claim `cnf`)
- AS checks that cert used for TLS and the `cnf` claim match at each token call



```
{
  "iss": "https://authserver.com",
  "sub": "random.user@example.com",
  "scope": "openid profile",
  "exp": 1693699893,
  "nbf": 1693699893,
  "cnf": {
    "x5t#S256":
    "bwcK0esc3BDC3DB2Y4_1ESsXE8o91tc05O89jdN-
    eb7"
  }
}
```

OAuth2: Demonstrating Proof of Possession

RFC 9449

A dedicated key pair is generated (decouple OAuth2 from TLS)


PoP either:

- in dedicated HTTP header as JWT

Or

- In access token `cnf` claim (`dpop_jtk`)

```
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
DPoP: eyJ0e...4PtFLFNyJK70nfbV37xRZT3Lg
grant_type=authorization_code
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt
&code=Sp1xl0BeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
...
```




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OAuth2: Device Flow

RFC 8705




Device : hardware device w/o keyboard (TV set, metering device, etc.).


1. User tries to connect device to RS
2. The device submits its client_id to the OP's device endpoint and gets a user code and validation URL.
3. User code & verif. URI displayed on the device (screen needed); device starts polling for token.
4. End-user enters its code at the verification URL (browser based)
5. Device receives tokens from /token and accesses resource
6. Device requests resource w/token

CIBA: use case

Online banking, e-commerce...



CIBA: ping mode




Authz Server notifies client upon Resource Owner's consent.

Rich Authorization Requests (RAR)

RFC 9396

- “Standard” OAuth2/OIDC access control : based on scopes
 - Communicate only claims included in scope
 - “openid”, “mail”, etc.
 - Rudimentary:
 - Action control ?
 - Timed requests ?
 - RBAC ?
- Solution : add a JSON object in *Authorization Requests*
 - Returned in response
 - Forwarded to RS


```
authorization_details:
{
    "type": "payment_initiation",
    "actions": ["initiate", "cancel"],
    "locations": [
        http://example.com/payments
    ],
    "instructedAmount": {
        "currency": "EUR",
        "amount": "123.50"
    },
    "creditorName": "Merchant A",
    "creditorAccount": {
        "iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
    },
    "remittanceInformationUnstructured":
        "Ref Number Merchant<<
}
```



Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR)


RFC 9126

- **Issue with « standard » authz requests (URI params)**
 - No crypto integrity protection
 - Requests may be too long for browsers
 - No confidentiality (encryption) possible
- **=> Solution : create a dedicated JSON Request object**



User-Managed Access (UMA)

OAuth2 vs UMA 2.0



Use case

User1 wants User2 to access his bank account balance, but he but doesn't want her to see his transaction history.

UMA

- Built on top of OAuth2
- Additional entity : requesting party (RqP)
- Access delegation: ie. makes resources shareable
- Allows asynchronous management of resources access

UMA : additional objects

Tokens

- **Access API token (AAT)**: UMA specific access token used to retrieve RqP permissions
- **Permission Ticket (PT)**: token representing permissions of a given RqP
- **Requesting Party Token (RPT)**: resource request token

Endpoints


- **/.well-known/uma2-configuration** : configuration discovery
- **/permission** : used by RS to retrieve PTs using PATs
- **/resource_registration** : used by RS to create resources on RO's behalf using PATs

Params

- dedicated scope: **uma_protection**
- dedicated grant_type: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:**uma-ticket**

UMA : Resource Owner's workflow


- Protection API token (PAT): service token specifically delivered to RS to manage RO's resources (scope uma_authorization)



```
{
  "resource_scopes": [
    "phone"
  ],
  "description": "Account read access",
  "iconUri": "http://www.example.com/icons/picture.png",
  "name": " Bank Account access",
  "type": "http://www.example.com/resource/bank-account",
  "user_access_policy_uri": https://myauthserver.fr/{domain}/uma/protection/resource\_set/{resource\_id}/policies
}
```

UMA : Authorization workflow

- **Access API token (AAT):** UMA specific access token used to retrieve RqP permissions
- **Permission Ticket (PT):** token representing permissions of a given RqP
- **Requesting Party Token (RPT):** resource request token



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Any questions ?

