


#### Sandbox IDs with Landlock

**FOSDEM** 


<u>Mickaël Salaün</u> – kernel maintainer



# What is sandboxing?

"A **restricted**, controlled **execution environment** that prevents potentially
malicious software [...] from accessing any
system resources except those for which
the software is authorized."

#### Landlock



- Access control system (orthogonal to namespaces)
- Dynamic security policies
- Embeddable in apps/services: unprivileged
- Enabled by default on most distros

#### Various use cases for IDs

Containers, IMA/EVM, audit...

# Container label/ID properties

- Inherited from process to process
- Immutable only extendable (e.g., strings)
- Global for privileged services
- Relative for unprivileged services
- Persistence uniqueness for attestation (e.g., 128-bit UUID)
- Predictable ID for attestation?
- CRIU support

## Landlock properties

#### Use case #1

**Untrusted applications**: protect from potentially malicious third-party code.

#### Candidates:

- Container runtimes
- Init systems

#### Use case #2

**Exploitable bugs in trusted applications**: protect from vulnerable code maintained by developers.

#### Candidates:

- Parsers: archive tools, file format conversion, renderers...
- Web browsers
- Network and system services


# Current access control


#### **Implicit restrictions**


- Process impersonation (e.g., ptrace)
- Filesystem topology changes (e.g., mounts), when it makes sense


#### **Explicit access rights**


- Filesystem
- Networking
- Signaling
- Abstract unix socket













P1























### Landlock domain IDs

### Landlock domain ID properties

- Unique during the lifetime of the running system: ~2<sup>60</sup> IDs
- First value randomly picked between 2<sup>32</sup> and 2<sup>33</sup>
  - Force u64 type to limit parsing issues
  - Limit collision in logs, can be concatenated with the boot ID for fleet-unique IDs
  - Mostly aligned IDs: ~same numbers of (hexadecimal) characters
- Sequential but not necessarily consecutives IDs: incremented between 1 and 16
  - Limit cover channels
  - Still expose sequentially domain creation: useful for domain ordering and to optimize ID lookup

# Use cases for Landlock IDs

Because of nested sandboxes there are two main use cases:

- 1. You create a sandbox and want to identify if a process is in this sandbox
- 2. You want to identify the latest layer of sandboxing restricting a task (i.e., the full sandbox)

### pidfd

- File descriptor referencing a process:
  - Proper kernel object with clear lifetime
  - Avoid race conditions (e.g., TOCTOU)
- Created from a PID or from a unix socket to identify a peer
- Used to send signal, wait... and read process properties thanks to the new PIDFD\_GET\_INFO IOCTL (for a set of properties):
  - PIDFD\_INFO\_CREDS
  - PIDFD\_INFO\_CGROUPID...

# Extended PIDFD\_GET\_INFO

Two new PIDFD\_GET\_INFO flags:

- PIDFD\_INFO\_LANDLOCK\_LAST\_DOMAIN
- PIDFD\_INFO\_LANDLOCK\_FIRST\_DOMAIN

[RFC PATCH v1 0/3] Expose Landlock domain IDs via pidfd

#### **Future work**

- Add a new interface for CRIU
- Add a dedicated introspection interface to safely read all properties of a sandbox; some ideas:
  - Properties (e.g., "comm") of the process that sandbox itself, which could be used to give a name to sandboxes, or to **label containers**?
  - Read properties of Landlock rulesets used to create domains
  - Walk through domain hierarchies
  - Get notifications about denied access requests...

# Could these IDs be used for other use cases?

- Inherited from process to process
- ✓ Immutable and extendable (e.g., strings)
- Global for privileged services
- Relative for unprivileged services
- ✓ Persistence uniqueness for attestation: add boot ID to a Landlock domain ID? (e.g., 128-bit UUID)
- > Predictable ID for attestation?
- ✓ Predictable label for attestation?
  - CRIU support

## Wrap-up

# Landlock roadmap

#### Ongoing work:

- Audit support to ease debugging and provide metrics
- Introspection interfaces (e.g., pidfd)
- New access-control types: socket creation, UDP port use...



#### Contribute

- Develop new access types or features
- Improve libraries: Rust, Go...
- Challenge the implementation
- Improve documentation or tests
- Sandbox your programs and others'
  - Secure Open Source Rewards
  - Google Patch Rewards


### Try Landlock

```
# WARNING: The "sandboxer" is a demonstration program,
# not a tool with a stable interface.

$ cargo install landlock --examples
$ sandboxer
```







landlock@lists.linux.dev

Thank you!