Booting blobs between U-Boot and Linux

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Bootloader stack - past, present, future

Bootloader stack

Software that runs between POWER ON and OS kernel

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- Evolved over time and grew in complexity
- Turned into multi-component software
- Expanded onto multiple cores

Bootloader stack – past

Past

- Bootloader was a single program, e.g. U-Boot
- Bootloader was stored in direct mapped memory, e.g. NOR

- On POWER ON, CPU starts executing NOR content
- Bootloader directly interacted with hardware
- Bootloader did hardware initialization
- Bootloader loaded and started kernel
- Kernel directly interacted with hardware
- Kernel did more hardware initialization

Bootloader stack - present

▶ ...

Present

- Bootloader stages are composed of multiple programs from multiple projects with disparate licensing
 - BootROM built into SoC Closed source
 - ▶ TFA (BL2, BL31, ...) BSD-3-Clause
 - TEE OpTee-OS BSD-2-Clause
 - U-Boot (and SPL, TPL, ...) GPL-2.0-or-later
- Bootloader stages are stored in various memory devices
- On POWER ON, CPU starts executing BootROM
- Some bootloader stages may directly interact with hardware
- Some bootloader stages may do hardware initialization
- Some bootloader stages may load and start kernels
- Kernel may directly interact with hardware
- Kernel may do more hardware initialization

Bootloader stack – future

▶ ...

Future

Bootloader stages are running on different CPU cores

Cortex-M or Cortex-R safety cores always on

Cortex-A application cores as needed

- On POWER ON, safety core starts executing BootROM
- Safety cores provide e.g. SCMI service for HW interaction
- Secure hardware blocks are controlled by safety cores only (clock, pinmux ...)
- Non-Secure hardware may be controlled by application cores

- Bootloader interacts with safety cores via some ABI to access secure hardware
- Kernel interacts with safety cores via some ABI to access secure hardware

Exception levels

Bootloader stages run in different Exception Levels, EL:

- EL3 highest level, unrestricted access to everything (FW)
- EL2 hypervisor (e.g. U-Boot and Linux)
- EL1 virtualized OS (e.g. virtualized Linux)
- EL0 applications
- Switch from higher EL to lower EL exception return
- Switch from lower EL to higher EL exception instruction
- ARM DDI 0487 D1.1 (aarch64) and G1.2 (aarch32) [LINK]

- SMC Trigger synchronous exception in EL3 (Secure monitor)
- HVC Trigger synchronous exception in EL2 (Hypervisor)

Services

- Bootloader stages may provide services:
 - BootROM built into SoC Fixed address function calls
 - TFA BL31 PSCI/SCMI provider
 - TEE SCMI provider
 - U-Boot PSCI provider
- Lower EL software can call those services
- ► Call is done either via direct function call, or SMC/HVC/...
- PSCI Power State Coordination Interface (CPU on/off/virt, power control)
- SCMI System Control and Management Interface (clock, pinmux, regulators ...)
- Interfaces to these services are an ABI
- Non-standard ABI extensions in vendor packages do exist
- Broken ABI changes across vendor package versions do happen

Firmware ABI

The firmware ABI must be stable, otherwise a system update can lead to either

Kernel only update:

- New kernel expects new ABI, old bootloader provides old ABI, system fails to boot
- Recovery kernel can likely still use old ABI
- System can be reinstalled with old kernel version
- Recovery likely possible
- Bootloader and kernel update
 - New kernel expects new ABI, new bootloader provides new ABI, system may boot
 - But if new kernel fails to boot ...
 - Recovery kernel expects old ABI, new bootloader provides new ABI, recovery system fails to boot
 - Recovery NOT possible, brick

Secure and non-secure resources

Bootloader stages may protect resources:

- Configure TrustZone to restrict access to peripherals
- Configure higher EL MMU tables to restrict access to memory ranges
- U-Boot was always meant as a boot monitor and debug tool
- If access to resources is blocked by higher EL blobs, this does not work
- EL and resource protection can be a good thing:
 - U-Boot could run in EL2 and use EL3 as access fault handler (suggested by Caleb)

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The plan

Reorder the bootloader stack

- FROM:
 - BootROM built into SoC EL3
 - TFA EL3 EL2
 - ► TEE EL2
 - U-Boot EL2
 - Linux EL2
- ► TO:
 - BootROM built into SoC EL3

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- U-Boot EL3
- TFA EL3 EL2
- ► TEE EL2
- Linux EL2

There are two platform specific issues to solve:

U-Boot may already depend on PSCI/SCMI calls

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TFA BL31/TEE may be started before U-Boot

U-Boot PSCI/SCMI dependency removal

- Very doable unless PSCI/SCMI provider closed source
- Many PSCI/SCMI providers do not guarantee source access
- Functionality accessed via PSCI/SCMI from software in EL2 is implemented in the PSCI/SCMI provider running in EL3 via direct register accesses
- Direct register access available in U-Boot running in EL3 too
- Implement clock/pinmux/regulator/...drivers in U-Boot DM (driver model)

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Run U-Boot in EL3 without calling PSCI/SCMI services

U-Boot PSCI/SCMI provider

- On ARM64, PSCI is mandatory, SCMI optional
- PSCI and possibly SCMI provider must start before Linux
- U-Boot running in EL3 can act as PSCI provider
- U-Boot can act as fallback PSCI provider until user one starts

- Full PSCI implementation is SoC specific
- Basic PSCI implementation can be completely generic
- arch/arm/mach-renesas/psci-rcar64.c

Starting TFA BL31 from U-Boot

Two ways of starting TFA BL31 from U-Boot in EL3:

- Direct via U-Boot shell (for development)
 - The same U-Boot executable can run in EL3 and EL2
 - Build TFA BL31 with destination address matching U-Boot proper load address (TEXT_BASE)
 - Load TFA BL31 to memory in U-Boot shell
 - Disable caches => dcache off ; icache off
 - Jump to TFA BL31 => go 0xaddress
 - TFA BL31 switches from EL3 to EL2
 - U-Boot is started again, this time in EL2
- Direct jump to Linux through TFA BL31 using fitImage
 - The fitImage container contains TFA BL31, Linux, DTs, ...
 - Support for starting TFA BL31 PSCI provider as part of fitImage posted [LINK to 3 patch series]
 - fitImage hooks set up TFA BL31 jump address to U-Boot kernel jump code

fitImage

fitImage

- Multi-component image type based on DT
- Capable of bundling multiple images into single container kernel images, ramdisks, DTs, firmware blobs, ...
- U-Boot is capable of booting fitImage
- OpenEmbedded core is capable of generating fitImage
- Recommended for any contemporary system using U-Boot

fitImage load and start

- U-Boot copies images referenced in selected fitImage configuration to their destination addresses in memory
- U-Boot runs loadable handler function for each image
- TFA BL31 firmware image type has been posted [LINK]
- Vendor specific TFA BL31 forks may require extra setup before being started
- TFA BL31 loadable handler and jump prep handler has been added for Renesas R-Car V4H

fitImage TFA BL31 image type

```
1 diff --git a/boot/image.c b/boot/image.c
 2 00 -183,6 +183,7 00 static const table_entry_t uimage_type[] = {
 3
                   IH_TYPE_FDT_LEGACY, "fdt_legacy", "legacy Image with Flat Device Tree ", },
 4
                   IH_TYPE_RENESAS_SPKG, "spkgimage", "Renesas SPKG Image" },
 \mathbf{5}
                   IH_TYPE_STARFIVE_SPL, "sfspl", "StarFive SPL Image" },
 6
                   IH TYPE TFA BL31, "tfa-bl31", "TFA BL31 Image", },
   +
 7
                                       "".
                   -1.
                                                     ....
                                                                           Ъ.
 8
    };
9
10 diff --git a/include/image.h b/include/image.h
11 @@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ enum image_type_t {
12
           IH_TYPE_FDT_LEGACY,
                                          /* Binary Flat Device Tree Blob in a Legacy Image */
13
          IH_TYPE_RENESAS_SPKG,
                                       /* Renesas SPKG image */
14
         IH TYPE STARFIVE SPL.
                                       /* StarFive SPL image */
15 +
          IH_TYPE_TFA_BL31,
                                         /* TFA BL31 image */
16
17
           IH TYPE COUNT.
                                          /* Number of image types */
18
19 diff --git a/boot/image-fit.c b/boot/image-fit.c
20 @@ -2167.6 +2167.7 @@ int fit image load(struct bootm headers *images, ulong addr.
21
           type_ok = fit_image_check_type(fit, noffset, image_type) ||
22
                     fit_image_check_type(fit, noffset, IH_TYPE_FIRMWARE) ||
23
                     fit image check type(fit, noffset, IH TYPE TEE) ||
24 +
                     fit_image_check_type(fit, noffset, IH_TYPE_TFA_BL31) ||
25
                     (image_type == IH_TYPE_KERNEL &&
26
                      fit image check type(fit, noffset, IH TYPE KERNEL NOLOAD));
```

fitImage TFA BL31 loadable handler

Loadable handler

- Called after the TFA BL31 firmware blob got loaded from fitImage to destination address in memory
- May set up hand-off tables or parameters for the firmware

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 Can be defined for any image type using macro U_BOOT_FIT_LOADABLE_HANDLER()

```
static void tfa bl31 image process(ulong image, size t size)
 1
 2
   ſ
 3
       /* Set up parameters passed to TFA BL31 by current stage */
 4
        struct bl2 to bl31 params mem *blinfo = ...;
 5
 6
        blinfo->... = ...;
 \overline{7}
       blinfo->... = ...;
        /* Cache TFA BL31 load address for armu8_switch_to_el2_prep() */
 8
9
        tfa_bl31_image_addr = image;
10 }
11
12 /* Define a handler for IH_TYPE_TFA_BL31 */
13 U_BOOT_FIT_LOADABLE_HANDLER(IH_TYPE_TFA_BL31, tfa_bl31_image_process);
```

fitImage kernel jump prep handler

- Jump handler prep is called shortly before Linux kernel starts
- The handler runs in EL3
- The handler does final setup and jumps to an entry point
- The entry point can be TFA BL31 entry point
- ▶ TFA BL31 is expected to return into U-Boot, but in EL2
- U-Boot is re-entered right past armv8_switch_to_el2
- U-Boot is re-entered without valid stack pointer anymore
- U-Boot armv8_switch_to_el2 runs and jumps to Linux

```
void armv8_switch_to_el2_prep(u64 args, u64 mach_nr, u64 fdt_addr, u64 arg4, u64 entry_pt, u64 es_flag)
 1
 2
   ſ
 3
       typedef void noreturn (*image entry noargs t)(void);
 4
       image_entry_noargs_t image_entry = (image_entry_noargs_t)(void *)tfa_bl31_image_addr;
 \mathbf{5}
       struct bl2_to_bl31_params_mem *blinfo = ...;
 6
 7
       /* Destination address in arch/arm/cpu/armv8/transition.S right past the first bl
8
        * in armv8_switch_to_el2() to let the rest of U-Boot pre-Linux code run. The code
9
         * does run without stack pointer! */
       const u64 ep = ((u64)(uintptr_t)&armv8_switch_to_el2) + 4;
10
11
12
       /* Set up kernel entry point and parameters: x0 is FDT address, x1..x3 must be 0 */
13
       blinfo->bl33 ep info.pc = ep;
14
15
       /* Jump to TFA BL31 */
16
       image entry();
17 }
```

fitImage TFA BL31 usage

- Integration into the fitImage ITS source is a firmware node
- fitImage is built using \$ mkimage -f fit.its fit.itb

```
/dts-v1/:
 1
 2
 3
   / {
        description = "Linux kernel with FDT blob and TFA BL31";
 4
 5
 6
        images {
 \overline{7}
            kernel-1 { ... };
 8
            fdt-1 { ... }:
9
            atf-1 {
                                      /* This is the TFA BL31 image */
10
                description = "TFA BL31";
                data = /incbin/("../build/plat/release/bl31.bin");
11
12
                type = "tfa-bl31": /* <----- This is the TFA BL31 image type */
13
                arch = "arm64";
14
                os = "arm-trusted-firmware";
15
                compression = "none":
16
                load = \langle 0x46400000 \rangle;
17
                entry = \langle 0x46400000 \rangle;
18
            };
19
        }:
20
21
        configurations {
22
            default = "conf-1":
23
            conf-1 {
24
                description = "Boot Linux";
25
                kernel = "kernel-1":
26
                fdt = "fdt-1";
27
                loadables = "atf-1"; /* <----- This is the TFA BL31 loadable */
28
            }:
29
        };
                                                                       ▲ロ▶ ▲周▶ ▲ヨ▶ ▲ヨ▶ ヨー の々ぐ
30 };
```

fitImage TFA BL31 boot example – U-Boot

```
1 u-boot=> tftpboot 0x48000000 v4h/fitImage && bootm 0x48000000
2 ...
 3 ## Loading kernel from FIT Image at 48000000 ...
 4 ...
 5 ## Loading fdt from FIT Image at 18000000 ...
 6 ...
 7 Working FDT set to 493ff200
 8 ## Loading loadables from FIT Image at 18000000 ...
9
      Trying [atf-1] loadables subimage
10
        Description: ARM Trusted Firmware
11
        Type:
                     TFA BL31 Image
12
      Compression: uncompressed
13
      Data Start: 0x4940f190
14
      Data Size: 131128 Bytes = 128.1 KiB
15
      Hash algo: crc32
16
      Hash value: 58f07ac9
      Verifying Hash Integrity ... crc32+ OK
17
18
      Loading loadables from 0x4940f190 to 0x46400000
19
      Loading Kernel Image to 50200000
20
      Loading Device Tree to 000000057fec000, end 000000057ffeede ... OK
21
   Working FDT set to 57fec000
22
23
   Starting kernel ...
24
25 [
        0.000000] Booting Linux on physical CPU 0x0000000000 [0x414fd0b1]
26 ...
```

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fitImage TFA BL31 boot example - Linux

```
1 F
        0.000000] psci: probing for conduit method from DT.
 2 [
        0.000000] psci: PSCIv1.1 detected in firmware.
 3 F
        0.000000] psci: Using standard PSCI v0.2 function IDs
 4 F
        0.000000] psci: Trusted OS resident on physical CPU 0x0
 5 F
        0.000000] psci: SMC Calling Convention v1.2
 6 ...
 7 Γ
        0.012046] smp: Bringing up secondary CPUs ...
 8 F
        0.020272] Detected PIPT I-cache on CPU1
 9 F
        0.020337] GICv3: CPU1: found redistributor 100 region 0:0x00000000f1080000
        0.020369] CPU1: Booted secondary processor 0x0000000100 [0x414fd0b1]
10 F
11 F
        0.024282] Detected PIPT I-cache on CPU2
12 F
        0.024332] GICv3: CPU2: found redistributor 10000 region 0:0x00000000f10a0000
13 [
        0.024352] CPU2: Booted secondary processor 0x0000010000 [0x414fd0b1]
14 F
        0.028264] Detected PIPT I-cache on CPU3
15 F
        0.028291] GICv3: CPU3: found redistributor 10100 region 0:0x00000000f10c0000
16 F
        0.028304] CPU3: Booted secondary processor 0x0000010100 [0x414fd0b1]
17 F
        0.028355] smp: Brought up 1 node, 4 CPUs
        0.028390] SMP: Total of 4 processors activated.
18 [
19 F
        0.028393] CPU: All CPU(s) started at EL2
20 F
        0.028397] CPU features: detected: 32-bit ELO Support
21 [
        0.028401] CPU features: detected: Data cache clean to the PoU not required for I/D coherence
22 [
        0.028407] CPU features: detected: CRC32 instructions
23 F
        0.028411] CPU features: detected: RCpc load-acquire (LDAPR)
24 [
        0.028415] CPU features: detected: LSE atomic instructions
25 [
        0.028419] CPU features: detected: Privileged Access Never
        0.028424] CPU features: detected: Speculative Store Bypassing Safe (SSBS)
26 F
27 [
        0.028463] alternatives: applying system-wide alternatives
28 [
        0.029869] CPU features: detected: Hardware dirty bit management on CPU0-3
29
30 root@linux-v4h:/# nproc
31 4
```

A/B update

- A/B update of TFA BL31 bundled into fitImage is trivial
- fitImage is a single file stored in filesystem, or a run of blocks on MTD device
- There can be multiple copies of different fitImages
- U-Boot can pick and boot one of the fitImages
- fitImage selection can be based e.g. on boot counter
- Even if the BL31 implements some sort of broken PSCI extension, this is now also fine – the kernel which likely depends on that extension is bundled together with the broken PSCI extension provider in the same fitImage and is updated in lockstep
- This avoids ABI mismatch between the kernel and firmware (PSCI provider)

Thank you for your attention

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