




**Hewlett Packard
Enterprise**

Secure Push Attestation with Extensible REST APIs

Jean Snyman FOSDEM '25







End-to-end solution for remote attestation

UEFI Measured Boot

IMA File Integrity





About me

Jean Snyman (he/him)  Bristol, UK

Research Engineer within the Security Lab at Hewlett Packard Labs

- ▶ Applied research in systems architecture and platform security

MSc in Information Security, University of Surrey

- ▶ Formal verification of security protocols
- ▶ Recipient of the Chartered Institute of Information Security's Fred Piper award as their choice for overall best student of 2023

Contributor to the Keylime open-source project


- ▶ Refactor of REST API code, agent-driven attestation, security



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Push Attestation Overview



★ New addition

Identity Trust Decisions

TPM-Platform Binding

Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture

Family "2.0"
Level 00 Revision 01.83
January 25, 2024

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Contact: admin@trustedcomputinggroup.org

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
9.4.4.3 RTR Binding to a Platform

The TPM reports on the state of the platform by quoting the PCR values. For assurance that these PCR values accurately reflect that state, it is necessary to establish the binding between the RTR and the platform.



Identity Trust Decisions


TPM-Platform Binding



Identity Trust Decisions

Option 1: Binding Using Device Identities


Existing Feature




Identity Trust Decisions

Option 2: Binding Using Webhook and Custom Trust Logic

NEW







Agent API Authentication

Proof-of-Possession (PoP) Protocol


NEW





Push Attestation API

Attestation Protocol



Push Attestation API

Example Request Body

NEW

1 POST /v3.0/agent/1/attestations

```
{
  "data": {
    "type": "attestation",
    "attributes": {
      "evidence_supported": [
        {
          "evidence_class": "certification",
          "evidence_type": "tpm_quote",
          "capabilities": {
            "spec_version": "2.0",
            "hash_algorithms": [ "sha3_512", "sha3_384", "sha3_256", "sha512", "sha384", "sha256", "sha1" ],
            "signature_schemes": [ "rsassa", "rsapss", "ecdsa", "ecdaa", "ecschnorr", "sm2" ],
            "attestation_keys": [
              {
                "key_class": "private_key",
                "key_identifier": "...",
                "key_algorithm": "rsa",
                "public_hash": "..."
              }
            ]
          }
        }
      ],
      "evidence_class": "log",
      "evidence_type": "mb_log"
    }
  }
}
```


Push Attestation API

Example Request Body

NEW

1 POST /v3.0/agent/1/attestations

```
    attestation_keys : [
      {
        "key_class": "private_key",
        "key_identifier": "...",
        "key_algorithm": "rsa",
        "public_hash": "..."
      }
    ]
  },
  {
    "evidence_class": "log",
    "evidence_type": "mb_log"
  },
  {
    "evidence_class": "log_partial",
    "evidence_type": "ima_entries"
  }
],
"boot_time": "2024-11-12T16:21:17Z"
}
}
```

Status

PR #1523

Foundational refactor of registrar web layer ✓

PR #1670

Identity trust decisions webhook

PR #1693


Push attestation protocol

PR #1731

PoP agent authentication protocol

PR #1704

Adversarial model used in the design of the push protocols



Thank you



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Credits

City 3D render by Sketchfab user “abhayexe”, used under Creative Commons Attribution license.

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