Trusted Execution Environments in combination with open-source and reproducible code provide transparency by relying on reviewers to analyze the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). And the size of the TCB directly influences the speed at which new releases and bug fixes are deployed to production, since reviews take a lot of time. So low-TCB environments are a desired solution that many teams try to achieve. But even the main security features needed to implement a trusted workload, such as end-to-end encryption, require significant increases in the TCB. For example, more general approaches like TLS with an extensive feature set including support for many signature schemes, certificate parsing and session resumption logic may be less ideal for low-TCB environments. To address this issue we will present a remote attestation scheme that uses Noise Protocol Framework to create an end-to-end encrypted attested channel between an end-user device and a TEE. Noise Protocol Framework allows us to minimize the amount of crypto primitives needed and only leave the logic that is necessary to establish an encrypted session and to bind it to the attestation evidence. During this talk we will also present an open-source implementation of our approach written in Rust.